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Scope and Method of Study: This study examines the poss ibility of 
reducing transaction costs through investment in multinational 
corporations ( MNCs). It is hypothesized that to attain a level of 
total risk equivalent to the u.s. market, fewer stocks of MNCs 
will be required as compared to stocks of purely domestic 
corporations. The study covers three time periods. The risk 
reduction characteristics of three categories of portfolios are 
analyzed. The first category consists of portfolios made up of 
purely domestic stocks. The second, of portfolios consisting of 
stocks of MNCs. And the third, of portfolios made up of stocks of 
ongoing multinational corporations (OMNCs), i.e., MNCs that 
continued to be MNCs through the entire test period. Total risk 
reduction is measured in terms of the number of stocks required to 
reach the market level of risk. Risk reduction is also analyzed 
in terms of the systematic and unsystematic components of total 
risk. Also, the risk/return performance of the three groups of 
portfolios is compared using t he coefficient of variation. 
Findings and conclusions: The findin gs of this study supported 
the primary hypothesis. As few as three stocks of ongoing 
multinational corporations were required to reach the market level 
of risk in one time period. In the same time period, seventy-five 
stocks of domestic corporations had a higher total risk than the 
market. An investor could thus reduce transaction costs by 
investing in a few stocks of multinational corporations, but at 
the same time, have portfolio risk equal to or less than the 
market. In all the time periods, MNC and OMNC portfolios 
consisting of more than 25 stocks had a total risk well below the 
market risk level. The risk reduction pattern of domestic 
portfolios was found to be significantly different from the risk 
reduction patterns of MNC and OMNC portfolios in two time periods. 
There were however, no significant differences in the risk 
reduction patterns of MNC and OMNC portfolios. The risk/return 
performance of domestic portfolios was generally better than MNC 
or OMNC portfolios. These differences, however, were significant 
in only one time period. 
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It is now well established that the risk associated with any 
inves tment is made up of two components. One component is attributable 
to overall market fluctuations and has been variously termed market 
risk or systematic risk or nondiversifiable risk. A s econd component 
is due to factors that are unique to the particular investment and is 
termed unique risk or unsystematic risk or diversifiable risk . 
By holding a portfolio of investments, the unique risk associated 
with each of the investments comprising the portfolio can be reduced. 
By careful choice of investments, unique risk can be mostly eliminated. 
Thus, the risk of a well-diversified portfolio can be measured by its 
market risk. This is a fundamental principle of modern portfolio 
theory. 
Market risk has also been s hown to consist of two components. 
One, called domestic market risk, is associated with the economic 
environment of a particular country. The other, termed international 
market risk, is associated with worl dwide economic conditions. 
The economic conditions of the various countries in the world 
have been shown to be less than perfectly correlated with each other. 
Hence, through the process of international diversification, i.e., by 
holding a portfolio of both foreign and domestic stocks, it is 
possible for an investor to eliminate a part o f the domestic market 
risk. By doing so, the investor would be left, at least in theory, 
with only the international market risk. This would represent the 
nondiversifiable risk; no amount of diversification will ensure that 
a portfolio will not react and move with the changes in the 
state of the world economy. 
Unfortunately, for most individual investors, international 
diversification is subject to many restrictive and sometimes 
prohibitive barriers.1 The investor has to consider the omnipresent 
foreign exchange risk, as well as the risk of expropriation of foreign 
holdings by a country. Many stock markets abroad are effectively 
closed to foreign investors, or are markets in countries from 
which funds cannot be removed. Also to be considered by the investor 
are the huge search and monitoring costs involved in international 
diversification. Timely and accurate information about the movements 
of foreign stocks is usually not easily obtainable. 
If an investor could somehow indirectly obtain the benefits of 
international diversification without having to face these problems, 
it would be very beneficial. The financ e literature discusses three 
ways by which a u.s. investor might possibly achieve the benefits 
of international diversification indirectly: 
(a) By holding stock s of foreign corporations traded on u.s. 
financial markets; 
(b) By investing in a mutual fund that holds an international 
portfolio; and, 
(c) By holding a portfolio of stocks of u.s. based 
multinational corporations (hereafter referred to as MNCs). 
This study reviews the literature on each of these three avenues 
and conducts empirical tests on the MNC avenue to indirect 
international diversification. 
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Several researchers in this area nave recognized the fact that 
MNCs achieve greater stability of operations, earnings, etc., due to 
their operations being spread over several countries. While exporting 
reduces the variability of only consolidated sales revenues, direct 
foreign investment p r ovides stability to both consolidated sales and 
costs of production. 
Theoretically, it would seem that portfolios made up of stocks of 
MNCs (hereafter called multinational portfolios) should not only be 
able to diversify some of the national market risk, but should also 
be able to reduce unsystematic risk quicker than purely domestic 
portfolios (portfolios made up of stocks of corporations with no or 
insignificant foreign operations). 
The logic behind this argument is that the countries in which 
MNCs operate have economies that are less than perfectly correlated 
with each othe r. Consequently, the returns on the stocks of MNCs 
should not be highly correlated with each other. The mathematics of 
portfolio variance are such that the lesser the positive correlation 
between the investments that make up the portfolio, the greater the 
degree of portfolio diversification. Thus, portfolios consisting of 
less correlated investments have lesser total risk than portfolios 
consisting of more h i ghly correlated investments. 
With multinational portfolios reducing both unsystematic risk and 
domestic market risk, it seems possible that a fewer number of MNC 
stocks would be necessary to achieve the same level of total risk 
reduction tha t would result from holdi ng a given number of purely 
domest ic stock s . This project is designed t o invest igate this 
possibility. 
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If the results of the study support the above hypothesis, they 
would be of value to an individual investor who would benefit by 
having to hold a portfolio consisting of fewer securities to achieve a 
given level of risk diversification. This would result in lower 
transaction costs and lower management costs f or the investor, thereby 




Tne past research that has investigated diversification is 
reviewed below in three sections. The first section reviews the 
research on portfolio diversification in general; the second section, 
the research on international diversification; and the third, the 
research on indirect international diversification. 
Portfolio Theory 
The elements of modern portfolio theory were developed from a 
series of propositions concerning rational investor behavior set forth 
by Markowitz (1952) and later expanded into book form (1959). The 
central theme of Markowitz's work is that rational inves tors should 
conduct themselves in a manner which reflects their inherent aversion 
to absorbing increased risk without compensation by an adequate 
increase in expected return. This indicates that for any given 
expected rate of return, where the expected return is a probability 
weighted mean, investors will prefer a portfolio containing minimum 
expected deviation of returns around the mean. Thus, r isk was defined 
by Markowitz as the uncertainty or variability of returns , measured by 
the standard deviation of expected returns about the mean . This was a 
pioneering work in the effort to quantify investment risk for 
por tfolio planning purposes. 
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Building on Markowitz's contribution, Sharpe (1963) s uggested 
that variation in portfolio return could be divided into two components. 
One, systematic variation, results from the covariation of the returns 
on the individual investments with the market return. The other , 
unsystematic variation, is attributable to the peculiarities of the 
individual investments themselves; i.e., it is that portion of the 
variation of an investment's return that is not attributable to the 
variation of the market return. If the covariation between individual 
investment returns arises solely as a result of t heir common 
correlation with the market return, it follows that the reduction in 
variation of a portfolio return resulting from increased 
diversification must be entirely a function of the reduction of the 
unsystematic portion of the total variation. 
Evans and Archer (1968) examined the rate at which the variation 
of returns for randomly selected common stock portfolios is reduced a s 
a function of the number of securities included in the portfolio. 
They were concerned with obtaining the minimum number of securities to 
include in a portfolio in order to provide variability comparable to 
market variability. By determining the minimum number of securities 
necessary to obtain this goal, one could then avoid the unnecessary 
transaction costs associated with further diversification. 
Evans and Arc her found that much of the unsystemati c variation is 
eliminated by the time the eighth security is added to the portfolio. 
They found that the addition of one security to a portfolio of size 
two caused significant reduction at the .05 lev el in the mean 
portfolio standard deviation; for portfolios of size eight, the 
necessary increa se for significant reduction was 19 securities; a nd 
for portfolio sizes greater than 19 securities, no significant 
reduction was possible within 40 additional securities. 
Thus, Evans and Archer concluded that the relationship between 
the number of securities included in a portfolio and the level of 
portfolio diversification appears to take the form of a rapidly 
decreasing asymptotic function, with the asymptote approximating the 
level of systematic variation in the market. They thus raised doubts 
concerning the economic justification of increasing portfolio size 
beyond 10 or so securities. Latane and Young (1969) verified Evans 
and Archer's results, finding that an eight stock portfolio achieves 
BS percent of the maximum possible benefits of diversification. 
Fisher and Lorie (1970) arr ived at a similar conclusion by 
finding that the opportunity to reduce dispersion through increasing 
the number of stocks in the portfolio is rapidly exhausted. Tney 
observed that approximately 40 percent of achievable reduction is 
obtained by holding two stocks; 80 percent, b y holding eight stock s; 
and 90 percent, by holding 16 stocks. 
Despite the above findings, several studies have questioned 
whether portfolios of only 10 to 20 securities sufficiently r educe 
variation. Authors of these latter studies contend that Evans and 
Archer and others did not measure risk properly. The total risk from 
holding a portfolio, they maintain, is not just the dispersion of the 
return of the portfo lio around its mean, but also the risk a s s ociated 
with the probability that the mean return on the portfolio will be 
different from the return on the market. 
Lorie (1975) argued that even small departures from perfect 
diversification create substantial amounts of risk. He showed that a 
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choice of 50 stocks out of the Standard and Poor's 500 index could 
produce annual returns that vary by as much a s 4.5 percentage points 
from the returns for the entire 500 stocks. Even as large a portfolio 
as 100 stocks might differ by as much as three percentage points from 
the 500 stock index. 
Upson, Jessup and Matsumoto (1975) measured the dispe rsion of 
possible portfolio returns around the market return and found that 
opportunities for reduction in the range of possible outcomes remain 
even after an eight-stock level. They found that, in comparison with 
portfolios containing one stock, portfolios containing eight stocks 
provided an average reduction in dispersion of 69 percent. However, 
when one holds 128 stocks rather than eight, dispersion is reduced 83 
percent. Thus, Upson et al. concluded that since increasing the 
number of stocks in a portfolio increases one's confidence of 
obtaining the market return, professionally managed common stock 
portfolios have a strong case for holding many more than eight, or 
even sixteen stocks. 
Elton and Gruber (197.7) compared the weekly variance of 
portfolios of different sizes to the variance of an equally weighted 
portfolio of 3290 securities selected from NYSE and AMEX , which they 
called the EWPP. The EWPP had the minimum total risk as represented 
by a variance of 7.07 percent. The maximwn total risk was a variance 
of 46.81 percent, the average variance of the outcomes of single 
security portfolios. As in other studies , these researchers found 
that the major decline in variance occurs at very low levels of 
portfolio size. For example, the variance of return for 10 s ecurity 
portfolios was 11.03 percent, one-fourth of what it was for a single 
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security. Even though this represents a major decrease, the total 
risk for the 10 security portfolios was 156 percent of the mi..nimum. 
For actual total risk to be only 20 percent higher than minimum total 
risk, 28 securities were required; for 10 percent higher, 60 
securities; and for five percent higher, 110 securitie s. Thus, Elton 
and Gruber concluded that the gains in decreased risk from adding 
stocks beyond 15 appeared to be significant. 
All the studies reviewed to this point inves tigated 
diversification by constructing equally weighted portfolios. A few 
researchers have attempted to reduce the number of securities needed 
to achieve a given level of diversification by using unequal, but 
optimal weights. These studies have produced mixed results. 
Johnson and Shannon (1974) found that, compared to equal 
allocation of securities within portfolios, allocations determined by 
quadratic programming resulted in superior returns for approximately 
the same variability. Also, fewer securities were necessary to 
achieve these results, which meant lower transa ction costs . 
Conversely, Lloyd, Hand and Modani (1981) found that optimal weighting 
did not significantly improve portfolio efficiency. 
Tole (1982) attempted to provide justification for increasing 
portfolio size beyond 16 or so securities by arguing that investors 
generally do not randomly select securities. Rather, investors 
construct portfolios based on the recommendations of brokerage firms 
or investment journals. Since such portfolios might contain 
securities that were highly correlated with each other, Tole opined, 
they require a s ubstantially greater number of securities than 
portfolios of random selection to attain adequate diversification. 
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His research supported this hypothesis. Tole concluded that an 
investor who owns a portfolio of securities that have not been 
randomly selected must own substantially more than the eight to ten 
stocks suggested in the previous studies such as Evans and Archer's. 
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Wagner and Lau (1971) studied the risk-return characteristics of 
portfolios comprised of several high risk securities versus portfolios 
comprised of smaller numbers of low risk securities. They found tha t 
portfolios consisting of large numbers of higher risk securities may 
be less risky than portfolios consisting of s maller numbers of low 
risk securities, yet earn a substantially higher rate of return. They 
concluded that investors with large portfolios could L~prove their 
investment performance by expanding their lists of qualified 
securities to include higher return, higher risk stocks. The increase 
in the market related component of risk that would result from such an 
investment policy would be offset by a substantial reduction in the 
portfolio's unique risk. 
Klemkosky and Martin (1975) examined the relationship between 
systematic and unsystematic risk, and the significance of that 
association on the process of diversification. They attempted to 
assess the practical importance of beta (\3 ), the measure of systema tic 
risk, on portfolio diversification by comparing the unsystematic risk 
of high and low beta stock portfolios containing from two to twenty 
five s ecurities. These comparisons indicated that the levels of 
diversification achieved for high v e rsus low beta portfolios for a 
given portfolio size were signi f icantly different. High beta 
po rtfolios required a substantially larger number of securities to 
achieve the same level of diversification as a low beta portfoli o. 
This information, concluded Klemkosky and Martin, would be of 
particular benefit to the investor who seeks maximum diversification 
with a limited number of securities. 
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Most studies that decomposed total risk into its systematic and 
unsystematic components used the variance of the portfolio as the 
measure of its total risk. Ben-Horim and Levy (1980) propos ed an 
alternate method for such a decomposition using the standard deviation 
as the measure of tota l risk. They argued that by defining the risk 
measures as portions of variance rather than standard deviation, the 
beta is squared and loses its sign. On decomposing risk for several 
time periods using standard deviation instead of variance, Ben-Horim 
and Levy found that systematic risk formed a l a rger portion of the 
total risk than found in earlier studies by Sharpe (1963) and 
others. 
The findings of the above researchers have an important impact on 
the topic of international diversification. In the next section, it 
is shown that international diversification across nations reduces 
national systematic risk. If systematic risk does form a large 
proportion of total risk, it is only logical that international 
portfolios must provide lower total risk levels as compared to 
dome s tic portfolios. 
These findings are also important to the topic of multinational 
diversification. Researchers have found that MNCs generally have 
lower betas than purely domes tic corporations. Kl e.mkosky and Martin's 
findings could mean that these lower betas might allow a specified 
level of diversification with fewer securities. 
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International Diversification 
The first published research on international portfolio 
diversification appeared in 1968. The pioneering work in this area 
began with studies of inter-country correlations. Grubel (1968) 
calculated rates of return for several national equity marke ts as well 
as the correlations between them. Using monthly data from 1959 to 
1966, he estimated the correlation coefficients between markets in the 
u.s. and other major stock markets. As Table I (Appendix A) 
indicates, he found very low corr elations. Solnik (1973) found 
similar estimates of the correlations between stock markets for many 
countries over the time period 1966 to 1971. Another study of the 
cor relation structure between world stock markets. between 1959 and 
1973 was conducted by Lessard (1975). Solnik's and Lessard's findings 
are also given in Table I. 
Whi le these three sets of correlation numbers are not in perfect 
agreement, they do suggest a certain degree of stability in 
inter-market relationships over the time periods studied. More 
importantly, they suggest that other major world stock markets are not 
highly correlated to the u.s. market. This has important implications 
for international diversification, as the advantages of 
diversification derive substantially from the imperfect correlations 
between the components of a portfolio. 
Watson (1978) calculated the correlation coefficients of the 
monthly returns for the period January 1970 to December 1971 between 
the share market indices of seven major countries . He found that 
inter-country cor relation coef ficients gener ally averaged a round 
+0.55. Maldonado and Saunders (1981) examined the inter-temporal 
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stability of correlations between monthly returns on a u.s. stock 
index and four foreign stock indices from the point of view of u.s. 
investors over four different time horizons. They found that in the 
very short term of up to two quarters, there was a relatively 
predictable relationship between inter-country correlations. However, 
beyond two quarters, inter-country correlations were generally 
unstable. For annual and biennial horizons, they found that they 
could not reject the hypothesis that these correlations follow a 
random walk. Maldonado and Saunders thus questioned the potential 
size of the gains from international portfolio investment for the U.S. 
investor. 
Lloyd, Goldstien and Rogow (1981) investigated data through 1977 
to update previously documented inter-country correlation 
coefficients. Their research indicated an increase in inter-country 
economic interdependence in the later years. An examination of the 
pairwise inter-country correlation coefficients for each of the two 
periods (1966 to 1971 and 1971 to 1977) they studied showed that more 
than 95 percent of all statistically significant changes in 
correlations were in the direction of more positive coefficie nts. 
Lloyd, Goldstien and Rogow concluded that in the past, low 
correlations between the markets of different countries might have 
made gains from international diversification possible. With the 
prospect of a greater number of positive cor relations, the gains 
realizable through international diversification may be lessened. 
Apart from these studies on inter-country correlations, several 
researchers have documented the benefits from international 
divers ification by actually constructing international portfolios. 
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Solnik (1974) found that in terms of variability of return, an 
internationally well-diversified portfolio was one-tenth as risky as a 
typical domestic security, and only half as risky as a well 
diversified portfolio of U.S. stocks with the same number of holdings. 
While increasing the size of purely domestic portfolios beyond 20 
stocks seemed to achieve only a relatively small incremental reduction 
in risk, a substantial reduction could still be achieved for an 
international portfolio of the same size. Even a mutual fund holding 
50 different foreign securities was found to benefit from additional 
holdings. 
However, Solnik noted, the advantages of international 
investment may be somewhat reduced by the possible imposition of 
exchange controls and capital restrictions on foreign holdings, and 
the existence of exchange risk, which could be very high in the then 
current atmosphere of relative monetary instability. 
Bergstrom (1975) documented the results of a group of 
professionally managed pilot portfolios that were internationally 
diversified. The performance of these portfol ios, given in Table II 
(Appendix A), is quite impressive. The international portfolios 
achieved returns nearly four times those of the NYSE composite index 
and also displayed a lower standard deviation. 
Levy and Sarnat (1970) demonstrated that a more efficient 
portfolio could be constructed for an investor who purchases both 
domestic and foreign stocks rather than jus t domestic stocks. 
Lessard (1973), using common stocks from four Latin American countries, 
showe d that international portfolios were superior in a r isk/return 
sense to portfolios that contained stocks from only one country. 
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Solnik and Noetzlin (1982) found that spreading investments over 
all major foreign markets decreased risk while enhancing return. 
Passive diversification along the lines of the Capital International 
World Stock Index involved less risk than a purely u.s. portfolio and 
provided a return more than 50 percent higher, even though u.s. stocks 
made up more than half this index. 
Logue (1982) examined the performance of actively and pa ssively 
managed international portfolios versus the performance of domestic 
portfolios. His research indicated that active international 
portfolio management is likely to generate such high transaction 
costs that any benefits from international diversification 
would be eclipsed. However, passive international diversification did 
produce better results than passive investment within the U,S. 
Cone and Weaver (1979) contributed to the internationa l portfolio 
diversification literature by illustrating that there exist not two, 
but three levels of risk for any security or portfolio. These they 
termed unsystematic security risk, unsystematic domestic 
market-related risk , and systematic world market risk. 
Cone and Weaver found that the average quarterly wealth relative 
or holding period return (HPR) of the internationally diversified 
portfolios ranged between 1.038 and 1.040. Domestically diversified 
portfolios' average quarterly HPR ranged between 1.029 and 1,031, The 
average standard deviation of the internationally diversified 
portfolios ranged between .061 and .065, while for the domestically 
diversified portfolios the range was between .086 and ,090. Cone and 
Weaver ob served that there were three levels of security and portfolio 
risk , and that the unsystematic world market risk is less than the 
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unsystematic domestic market-related risk. They wrote that portfolios 
which are diversified internationally tend to be more efficient in 
terms of risk and return than are portfolios diversif ied domes tically. 
Further, "interperiod variation of portfolio returns can be reduced by 
diversifying internationally without incurring a return penalty. 
Greater efficiency is realized because what has previous ly been 
treated as undiversifiable systematic risk is in fact partially 
diversifiable at the international level" (Cone and Weaver, pp. 54-55). 
Indirect International Divers ification 
There are several barriers to direct international 
diversification, especially for individual investors.2 Several 
approaches to indirectly obtain the benefits of international 
diversification have been suggeste d including: 
(1) Investment in foreign securities listed on the home market; 
(This is to be distinguished from direct international d iversification 
by investing in foreign securities in their respective national 
markets. The latter involves transactions through the foreign 
exchange market). 
(2) Investment in investment funds with an international 
orientation; and, 
(3) Invesunent in the stocks of home based multinational 
corporations (MNCs). 
Senchak and Starks (1978) examined the gains in risk reduction 
and in realized monthly returns from portfolios of foreign securities 
traded in u.s. markets, as compared to portfolios of domestic stocks. 
They found that foreign stock portfolios have both an initally lower 
level of total risk, and a much lower asymptotic level of total risk 
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than domestic portfolios. It took only a three-stock portfolio of 
foreign stocks to approximate the same level of total risk as the 
market portfolio comprised of the entire sample of 212 domestic 
stocks. However, the portfolio comprised of all the foreign stocks in 
the sample had a lower geometric mean return per unit of standard 
deviation than did the domestic stock market portfolio. Conversely, 
the foreign security portfolios had much lower betas, and a higher 
return per unit of beta than the domestic portfolios. 
Senchak and Starks also measured the rate of variability 
reduction for the foreign and domestic portfolios. Without Canadian 
stocks, which seemed to correlate highly with the U.S. market, the 
foreign portfolios were found to have a considerably higher marginal 
rate of variability reduction. 
Little research has focused on investment funds that hold 
international portfolios. McDonald (1973) investigated the 
performance of internationally diversified French mutual funds and 
found that these funds generally produced superior risk adjusted 
returns as compared to purely domestic mutual funds. Another study 
on similar lines was by Farber (1975). 
Researchers have shown considerable interest in indirect 
international diversification through investment in MNCs, perhaps due 
to the highly practical nature of this approach. MNCs are generally 
quite large and well established, and their securities can readily be 
b ought and sold. Mixed evidence has been found, however, on whether 
or not MNCs provide an adequate vehicle for obtaining the benefits of 
indirect international diversification. 
Studies in this latter area are discussed below gro uped into four 
subsections. The first subsection covers allied research which has 
contributed to the study of indirect international diversification 
through MNCs, but which did not make actual comparisons of the 
portfolio performance of MNCs versus domestic corporations. The 
second subsection describes studies that nave examined only the 
risk reduction characteristics of multinational and domestic 
portfolios, without considering the returns from these portfolios. 
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The third subsection covers research that studied both risk and return 
in this context. The fourth subsection describes a study of the risk 
reduction of multinational and domestic portfolios as the number of 
securities is increased. 
Allied Research 
Koners (1975) investigated the effect of foreign operations on a 
firm's cost of capital. He began his study with the assumption that, 
because of the many added variables to which MNCs are exposed to 
overseas, the degree of risk typically associated with business 
operations abroad is higher than that for domestic operations. If 
this assumption were true it would follow that a company, by entering 
foreign markets, would have automatically raised its cost of capita l. 
This is a result of the added risk, real or perceived, which is 
commonly associated with business operations abroad. 
Kohers' research, however, indicated that in general, investors 
do not appear to penalize the stocks of u.s. corporations when their 
business activities extend beyond u.s. boundaries. A grouping of his 
results by industr y showed that there was no significant difference in 
the cost of capital to MNCs versus domestic corporations in the same 
industry. An exception was the Chemical and Allied Products industr y, 
where multinational firms incurred significa ntly higher costs of capital. 
Kohers concluded that companies can continue to invest overseas 
without fear of being penalized for such action by investors. 
19 
Brewer and Miller (1979) examined whether international economic 
events affect multinational and domestic firms differently. They 
examined the effect of two events that occured in 1971-72 : (a) the 
change from a fixed exchange rate system to a variable system based on 
foreign exchange market forces; and (bl the decline in the value of 
the U.S. dollar in relation to other major currencies. 
Their results suggested that international economic events do 
affect MNCs and domestic firms differently. Investors' perceptions 
of the riskiness of MNCs, as indicated by beta seemed to have 
increased, relative to domestic firms, in the post-1973 period. On 
the other hand, returns to MNCs adjusted upward compared to nationals 
following the move to floating exchange rates. This finding, Brewer 
and Miller concluded, lends support to the notion that investors 
perceive MNCs to be better able than domestic firms to provide 
positive real returns during periods when the national currency value 
is deteriorating. 
Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983) a ttempted to determine whether the 
U.S. equity markets react to foreign merger bids differently than to 
domestic merger bids. In the presence of barriers to investors in 
achieving direct international diversification, they argued, 
international mergers should benefit the acquiring company's owners by 
indirectly diversifying internationally. This may result in higher 
premiums being offered to the acquired company's shareholders. Their 
research indicated that although foreign acquirers did appear to 
reward shareholders of u.s. acquired companies with larger premiums 
than domestic acquirers, these differences were not statistically 
significant. 
Studies analyzing Risk Reduction 
Several researchers have studied the possible benefits of risk 
reduction from holding portfolios of MNC stocks versus portfolios 
comprised of purely domestic stocks. 
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Rugman (1976) found that there was an inverse relationship 
between profit variability and the percentage of foreign sales in the 
1960-1969 period, based on data for the 500 largest U.S. corporations. 
He regressed the variance of the rate of return on capital against a 
measure of multinational activity and found a negative relationship 
which was significant at the .01 level. This, he opined, implied that 
multinationality reduced profit variance, thus lowering risk. 
Rugman concluded from this study that international 
diversification by otherwise domestic corporations may benefit the 
risk-averse investor who, because of barriers to free movement in the 
international capital markets such as the interest equalization tax 
in the U.S., could not directly diversify internationally. 
Aggarwal (1979) extended Rugman's results to 1974. He too, 
observed a significant relationship between multinationality and risk •. 
This study focused on the systematic component of risk as measured by 
beta . His results appeared to indicate that, when measured from the 
domestic investor's point of view, the u.s. capital market in 1974 
rewarded an increasing proportion of multinational activity by a 
reduction in systematic risk and also a proportional increase in the 
price/earnings ratio for such companies. Aggarwal concluded that 
the mult.inational activities of U.S. companies seem to offer U.S. 
investors advantages not available to them by investing in purely 
domestic companies. 
Barone (1983) sought to extend Rugman's and Aggarwal's findings 
to the 1974-1979 period. Barone opined that since the world appears 
to have changed structurally in the last half of the 1970s, investor 
perceptions regarding risk and international diversification may have 
altered significantly. He pointed out three factors to corroborate 
this view: 
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(1) On January 1, 1977, the FASB required that all exchange gains and 
losses be included in the income statement for the period in which the 
exchange rate changed (FASB No. 8). Prior to this, a MNC could use 
a reserve to cushion the swings in earnings caused by exchange rate 
fluctuations. Although this was only a change in accounting practice, 
Barone argued, the reported earnings of MNCs may nave appeared to be 
more volatile to investors. 
(2) By 1979, 28 percent of u.s. foreign direct investment was in l ess 
developed countries (LDCs) as opposed to 18 percent in 1974. 
Political risk in the LDCs is generally recognized to be higher than 
in developed countries. Thus, the trend toward investment by 
multinationals in LDCs may have increased investors' risk 
perceptions. 
(3) Increasing economic integration may have raised the correlation 
between economic swings in world economies in the late 1970s. The 
energy crisis and rising e nergy prices, for example, caused sharp 
industrial production decreases in every major industrialized country 
in 1974. This was in marked contrast to the mostly countercyclical 
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nature of the U.S. and European industrial economies prior to that 
period. 
Barone hypothesized that for these reasons, international 
diversification of u.s. corporations during the 1974-79 period exerted 
less influence on investor perceived risk. During this period, the 
positive benefits from international diversification by a MNC may have 
been outweighed by an increase in the perceived level of absolute 
risk. His r esults, however, indicated that over the 1974-79 period 
taken as a whole, a greater degree of multinational operations was 
associated with higher price/earnings ratios. 
When the data was disaggregated and the analysis performed year 
by year, the relationship between multinationality and s y stematic risk 
appeared to have deteriorated over time. By 1979, there was almost no 
significant relationship between international diversification and 
market behavior. Barone thus concluded that increasing international 
economic integration in the last half of the 1970s may have eroded any 
risk reduction benefits that multinationals were providing to 
investors during earlier periods. 
Agmon and Lessard (1977) reasoned that there are barriers or 
costs to portfolio capital flows between countries which are higher 
than barriers or costs to capital flows from direct investment. 
Further, the flexibility of the MNC in shifting resources among its 
operating units sugge sts that eve n whe n the b a r riers a re nomi na lly the 
same, direct investment flows will be freer than portfolio flows. 
Agmon and Lessard inves tigated the existence of a diversifica tion 
motiv e f or expansi on o f multinati onal activities by t e s ting whe ther 
investors appeared to recognize the divers ification opportunities 
provided by MNCs. They studied the relationship betwee n share-price 
behavior and the extent of foreign involvement and found that the 
return on portfolios with foreign involvement was highly correlated 
with the return on a world index. This world index did not include 
the U.S. market. They also found that the higher the level of 
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foreign involvement, the more significant the correlation of portfolio 
return with the world index. Agmon and Lessard concluded that the 
U.S. market recognizes the geographically diversified nature of MNCs 
as well as the extent of their foreign involvement. 
Errunza and Senbet (1981) hypothesized that MNCs have special 
advantages in the financial sector which are quite ana logous to 
monopoly rents in the real sector. Therefore, if the u.s. market is 
functioning efficiently, investors must accept a s maller equi librium 
expected return on multinational stocks than on otherwise equivalent 
domestic stocks. They found that: (a) the current degree of 
international involvement, proxied by the foreign sales percentage, is 
positively and significantly related to excess market value;3 (b) the 
growth in international invo~vement is also positively related to 
excess market value but is not a significant variable except in 
association with the current level of international involvement; and 
(c) the relationship between international involvement and exces s 
market valuation is stronger during periods characterized by u.s. 
restrictions on capital flows in c omparison to periods devoid of such 
barriers. 
In contrast to the above studies, Jacquil lat and Solnik (1978 ) 
a ctually constr ucted multinatio nal and domes tic portfolios to compare 
their riskiness and examine whether investment in MNCs presents the 
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same characteristics as international portfolio diversification. They 
found that the variability of returns, as measured by the standard 
deviation, of multinational portfolios was usually 90 percent of that 
of a purely domestic portfolio of the same size. In contrast, 
international portfolios of similar size had a risk of only 30 to 50 
percent of the risk of a domestic portfolio. Further, they observed, 
the extent of the foreign influence on MNC stock prices appears 
unexpectedly limited compared to the extent of the MNC's foreign 
involvement. MNC stock prices, Jacquillat and Solnik reported, do not 
seem to be extensively affected by foreign factors and behave much 
like the stock prices of purely domestic firms. They concluded that 
although multinationals do perform some international diversification 
for the investor, they are poor subst itutes for international 
portfolio diversification. 
Studies that considered Risk and Return 
Hughes, Logue and Sweeney (1975 ) attempted to determine whether 
the total variability of· returns for MNCs is less than, equal to, or 
greater than the risk of otherwise s imilar domestic fir ms in terms of 
size, product diversification, etc. They also compared MNCs and 
domestic firms with respect to the s ystematic and unsystematic 
components of risk. Further they analyzed the relative performance, 
on a risk/return bas is, of the two types of firms. 
Hughes, et al., studied 46 MNCs and 50 domestic firms during the 
period 1970 to 1973. They found that the returns on MNCs were higher 
tha n the r eturns on purely d omestic firms. Similarl y, measur es of 
systematic risk for MNCs were significantly lower than the comparable 
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measures for domestic firms. The distribution of measures of 
unsystematic risk were also significantly lower for MNCs. Their major 
findings are summarized as follows: (1) Irrespective of the index 
used, MNCs have lower systematic risk, lower unsystematic risk, and 
hence lower total risk; (2) MNCs' average returns were higher than 
returns on comparable domestic firms; (3) when b e tas are computed 
using a domestic market index, the risk-adjusted performance of MNCs 
exceeded that of comparable domestic firms; and, (4) when betas are 
computed using a world index, the perf ormance of MNCs and domestic 
firms was quite similar. Hughes, Logue and Sweeney concluded that 
investors correctly perceive the diversification benefits of shares of 
MNCs, and that such firms do indeed provide something for investors. 
Kohers (1976) examined the effect of foreign expansion on a 
company's risk/return performance in various industries. He studied 
52 MNCs and 51 domestic corporations for the period 1963-1972. These 
firms were grouped into seven indus~ries. Kohers' results are shown 
in Table III (Appendix A). Kohers found that at the .05 significa nce 
level, no statistical difference s existed in total risk between MNCs 
and domestic corporations within any industry. An examination of 
returns revealed that only the MNCs in the Chemical and Allied 
Products Industry had a significa ntly higher return than their 
domestic counterparts. No statistically significant differences 
existed in the risk/return of any of the othe r six industries as well 
as between all MNCs and domestic corporations. 
Kohers concluded that expansions into foreign markets did not 
appear to have any negative impact on the risk/return performance of 
corporations. Consequently, he suggested that investors in MNCs need 
not fear that overseas operations will have a negative effect on the 
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MNCs' risk/return composition. 
Mikhail and Shawky (1979) compared the returns and the 
risk-adjusted return of multinational portfolios to the S&P 500 index. 
They found that, measured only by return, MNCs outperformed the 
average market (proxied by the S&P 500 index) 69 percent of the time. 
Of the thirty-two quarters Mikhail and Shawky studied, MNC returns 
exceeded those of the S&P 500 index in twenty-two. They also 
examined the variability of the returns of both the MNC sample 
and the S&P index as measured by the standard deviation and the 
coefficient of variation. Their results are given in Table IV 
(Appendix A). From Table IV, it can be observed that though the mean 
return for the MNCs are consis t e ntly higher than the S&P means returns, 
the coefficient of variation as a measure of relative dispersion is 
not systematically higher for MNCs than for the S&P 500 index. 
This is surprising, Mikhail and Shawky noted, since theory suggests 
that if returns for MNCs are consistently higher than the S&P index, 
their risks should also be consistently higher than the S&P index . 
They concluded that the risk-adjusted performance of MNC stocks is 
somewhat superior to the performance of the average market. 
Brewer's (1981) study not only supporte d the conclusions of 
Jacquillat and Solnik (1978), but also challenged previous findings 
that MNCs' performance was superior to that of domestic corporations 
in a risk/return sense. Brewer hypothesized that there is no 
difference in the risk-adjusted performance of MNC and domestic 
stocks. His empirical tests, involving stock s of 151 MNCs and 137 
domestic corporations, failed to disprove his hypothesis. Ther e was 
no statistically significant difference i n the r i s k-adju s ted 
performance of MNC and domestic stocks. He thus concluded that MNCs 
provided no discernible advantage over domestic firms with respect to 
an investor's quest for the risk/return benefits of international 
portfolio diversification. 
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Logue (1982) studied active and passive portfolio management 
using stocks of the 50 largest U.S. based MNCs, foreign stocks, and 
the NYSE index. He compared the portfolio performance of actively 
managed multinational portfolios with t he performance of portfol ios 
made up of foreign stocks bought in their national markets (direct 
international diversification). From a risk/return point of view, the 
actively managed portfolios of MNC stocks performed slightly better 
than the actively managed portfolios of foreign stocks. Moreover, 
the international and MNC portfolios both dominated passive investment 
in the NYSE index. 
Logue pointed out that most portfolios are actively managed. In 
his study, the active management of international portfolios often 
resulted in frequent movement of capital across country borders. This 
strategy would generate transaction costs so high that any advantages 
to international diversification might be eliminated. Thus , Logue 
argued, if portfolios are to be actively managed, multinational stocks 
provide better investments than even foreign stocks. 
Studies of the speed ot Diversification 
A study by Senchak and Beedles (1980) examined the speed and 
extent of diversification benefits from MNCs compared to r andomly 
selected domestic firms. Senchak and Beedles studied 240 industrial 
MNCs during the period 1973-1976. For comparison, they selected 
random samples of firms from the CRSP tapes, excluding their list of 
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multinationals. Their study reveale d that while the average return on 
multinational and domestic portfolios was virtually the same, the 
standard deviation of the fully diversified multinational portfolio 
was larger than the standard deviation of a portfolio of domestic 
securities of equa l size and systematic risk. 
Senchak and Beedles also found that for portfolio sizes greater 
than 5, beta equivalent domestic portfolios generally had a lower 
level of total risk as compared to multinational portfolios. They 
also found that as portfolio size increased, domestic portfolios 
diversified unsystematic risk faster than multinational portfolios. 
Senchak and Beedles concluded that MNC stocks do not appear to provide 
diversification benefits comparable to those provided by domestic 
stocks. 
To summarize, Brewer (1981) found no significant difference in 
the performance of multinational and domestic portfolios. Senchak and 
Beedles (1980) found that though the return on multinational and 
domestic portfolios was approximately the same, multinationa l 
portfolios had a higher s tandard deviation than beta-equivalent 
domestic portfolios. Other researchers, including Hughes, Logue and 
Sweeney (1975), Mikhail and Shawky (1979), and Logue (1982) claim that 
the performance of multinational portfolios is s up e r ior to that of 
domes tic portfolios. The fact whether MNCs provide an indirect 
vehicle to international diver sificatio~ therefore continues to remain 
controversial, 
Even if multinational portfolios do not perform any better than 
domestic portfolios, there may exist yet another reason to invest in 
MNC stocks. If MNCs can provide a given level of diversi fication with 
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fewer stocks as compared to domestic corporations, investment in MNCs 
could mean a reduction in transaction and management costs. This in 
turn, means a higher net return on investment. It is this dimension 
of multinational diversification that this study seeks to explore. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Purpose of this Study 
The present study examines the degree of diversification of 
multinational portfolios compared to domestic portfolios in the same 
vein a s Solnik's (1974) study involving international portfolios. The 
degree of diversification is measured in terms of the number of stocks 
required to reach the u.s. market level of risk. Risk reduction, as 
the number of securities in a portfolio increases, is also examined in 
terms of the systematic and unsystematic components of risk. 
Hypothesis 
It is hypothesized that to reduce portfolio risk to the level of 
risk of the U.S. market, fewer stocks of multinational corporations 
will be required as compared to stocks of domestic corporations. 
Definitions 
Multina tional corporation 
Past studies have used varying definitions of a MNC as delineated 
below. 
Logue (1982) chose the 50 largest MNCs in the u.s. for his study, 
based on a listing in Forbes magazine. Forbe9 lists the largest 125 
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MNCs in the U.S. on the basis of the dollar amount of their foreign 
sales. 
Vaupel and Curhan (1973) identified 187 MNCs using the f o llowing 
criteria: (1) a MNC must hold equity interests in manufacturing firms 
located in six or more countries outside the U.S. Such equity 
interest should amount to at least 25 percent of the total equity of 
the firm; and (2) a MNC must not be a subsidiary of some other 
corporation. 
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Bruck and Lees (1968) classified firms with foreign operations in 
the following manner: (1) MNCs are defined as corporations with more 
than 50 percent of their business, i.e., sales, earnings, employment, 
or production outside the u.s.; (2) internationally oriented 
companies are defined as those with 25 to 50 percent of their business 
overseas; and (3) firms with significant foreign operations are 
defined as those with 10 to 24 percent of business overseas. 
It appears that most researchers have used foreign sales as a 
proxy for measuring the degree of international involvement. The 
proportion of foreign sales that makes a firm multinational, however, 
has differed from study to study. 
Errunza a nd Senbet(1981) found that foreign assets or earnings 
we re insignificant as proxies for current international involvement. 
This, they explain, is due to the fact that the reported foreign net 
asset and net earnings figures are outcomes of the home and host 
country accounting conventions, translation procedures used by the 
MNC, and inter-company allocations. Thus, net asset and earnings 
figur es are some what arbitrary, and may not eve n be compar able across 
the subsidiaries of a MNC. 
For the purposes of this study, a multinational corporation is 
defined as a firm whose foreign sales constitute at least 20 percent 
of its total sales. The 20 percent cut off point wa s chosen 
arbitrarily, keeping in view the fact that any higher percentage 
requirement would have reduced the already small sample sizes of 
MNCs. This definition of a MNC is justified by the fact that most 
res earchers have tended to use a foreign sales requirement between 15 
and 50 percent. Also, there has bee n no study to determine what 
proportion of a MNC's sales should be abroad to have a significant 
effect on its common stock returns. 
Ongoing Multinational Corporation 
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Previous researchers, with the exception of Logue (1982), have 
generally not ensured that the MNCs in their samples remained MNCs 
through the period they studied. Logue scree ned his sample of MNCs to 
ascertain that they remained multinationals all through the decade in 
which he examined them. 
It is possible that the continuing multinationality of a MNC may 
affect the risk reduction character istics of its common stock. To 
determine whether this factor is of any significance, multinational 
and domestic portfolios are compared in this study to portfolios made 
up of firms that were MNCs throughout the study period. The MNCs that 
are multinationals through the s tudy period are hereafter referred to 
as ongoing multinationals (OMNCs). 
Domestic corpor ation 
Domestic corporations are defined as fi rms with no or 
insignificant foreign operations. The procedure adopted to obtain a 
list of purely domestic corporations is detailed in the Data Sources 




International economic conditions change over time. Brewer and 
Miller (1979) found that international economic events affect MNCs and 
domestic corporations differently. Previous studies on indirect 
international diversification such as Hughes, Logue and Sweeney 
(1975); Jacquillat and Solnik (1978); Senchak and Beedles (1980), and 
Brewer (1981), however, have tended to concentrate on a single time 
period. 
To eliminate any possible bias in the performance of MNCs due to 
worldwide economic conditions prevailing in any one time period, it 
was decided to examine the data from three different time periods for 
this study. 
Three five-year periods--1966 to 1970, 1972 to 1976, and 1977 to 
1981--were chosen to ensure an adequate number of monthly data po i nts 
for regression analysis. The c hoice of the actual years was based o n 
the availability of data regarding MNC classification. A list of MNCs 
a s of January 1, 1967, was not available to provide contiguity among 
the three time periods studied. 
Industrial Corporations 
As the section on data sources for this study will explain, the 
sample of domesti c corporations wa s obtained by eliminating companies 
with foreign operations from the list of firms on the University of 
Chicago's Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) tape. Since 
there are no MNC utilities, such a process of elimination might 
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r esult in a disproportionate number of utilities in the lists of 
domestic corporations. To avoid any b ias due to the presence of these 
low-beta utilities in the domestic firms samples, it was decided to 
restrict the samples of MNCs and domestic corporations to industrial, 
non-financial corporations only. This was done by eliminating 
companies with a Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code greater 
than 3990. 
Market Index 
The standard deviation of multinational and domestic portfolios 
is compared to the standard deviation of the market portfolio to 
measure the degree of risk diversification. This study uses the CRSP 
monthly index, which consists of all the stocks traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange. The monthly index used in this study is 
equally-weighted, and includes all distributions. 
There exists a controversy as to whether it is appropriate to 
measure s ystematic r isk using a domestic or international index [Logue 
and Rogalski, (1979)]. This study, however , is focus ed on indirect 
international diversification only, and a ll the stocks utilized here 
are from u.s. financial markets. It is hence considered appropriate 
to use the CRSP dome s tic index. 
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Data Sources 
Monthly Returns Data 
In consonance with other studi es, [Mikhail and Shawky (1979); 
Brewer (1981); a nd Logue (1982)] monthly returns a r e used to compute· 
the various risk and return measures. The monthly returns for the 
individual stocks and the index are from the CRSP monthly returns 
file. The CRSP returns include capital gains plus dividends and other 
distributions, all divided by the stock's base price, 
sam2les of Multinational corporations 
1966-1970. For this time period, the list of MNCs as of January 
1, 1966, given in the study by Bruck and Lees (1968) was utilized. 
1972-1976. A list of MNCs as of January 1, 1972, was publis hed 
in Standard and Poor•s OUtlook.4 This list, which was based on the 
1971 operations of these companies, was the source for this time 
period, 
1977-1981. The list of MNCs as of January 1, 1977, was also 
obta{ned from Standard and Poor•s Outlook,5 This list is based on the 
companies' 1976 operations. 
From the above sources, the MNC samples used in the study were 
obtained in the following manner, First, corporations with less than 
20 percent foreign sales were eliminated. Then, MNCs for which 
mo nthly returns data was not available on the CRSP tape for the 
required time periods were deleted, The remaining corporations were 
checked to ensure that their SIC code was below 3990. 
This process resulted in a sample of 47 MNCs f o r the 1966-70 
period; 110 MNCs for the 1972-76 period; and 131 MNCs for the 1977-81 
period, 
36 
Samples of Ongoing Multinational Corporations 
1966~1970. The 1966 list of MNCs was compared to a list of MNCs 
as of January 1, 1971, which appeared in the Standard and Poor's 
Outlook.6 Thirty-five of the 45 MNCs on the 1966 list appeared on the 
1970 list. These MNCs formed the OMNC sample for the 1966-70 period. 
1972-1976. The 1972 list of MNCs was checked against the 1977 
list of MNCs. Of the 110 MNCs on the 1972 list, 63 appeared on the 
1977 list and formed the OMNC sample for this period. 
1977-1981. The 1977 list of MNCs was compared with a list of 
MNCs as of January 1, 1981, obtained from Forbe~.7 Of the 131 MNCs on 
the 1977 list, 59 appeared on the 1981 list and made up the sample of 
OMNCs for the 1977-81 period. 
It should be noted that the sources from which the different 
lists of MNCs were obtained were not always the same. This is due to 
the lack of a regular, yearly l i sting of multinationals from any 
single source. Different publications use different criteria in 
listing multinationals and often report only the largest 100-125 MNCs 
bas ed on dollar overseas sales, percent foreign operations, or foreign 
assets. Also, changes in the reporting methods of the corporations 
themselves affect their listing as multinationals. Thus, although 
not all the MNCs appeared on lists at the beginning and the end of a 
time period and were classified as OMNCs, one cannot conclude that the 
others gave up or decreased their foreign involvement. 
Finally, the lists of OMNCs are made up of MNCs that had at least 
2 0 percent foreign sales at the b e ginning and at the end o f a time 
period. Annual lists of MNCs were not available during the periods 
studied. No check could thus be made on the overseas operations of 
the MNCs year to year. 
Samples of Domestic corporations 
The samples of purely domestic corporations were obtained in the 
following manner: 
(1) The CRSP monthly returns file contains data for 2934 
corporations. Companies that did not have returns data for the 
required time period were first deleted. 
(2) The SIC codes for the remaining corporations were checked 
and those with SIC codes above 3990 were eliminated. 
(3) Those remaining were checked against the lists of MNCs to 
remove multinational corporations. 
(4) This listing was then checked against the Directory of 
American Firms operating in Foreign Cow'l.tries 8 and firms with any 
foreign operations were removed. 
37 
(5) Finally, for the remaining firms, Annual Reports and 10K 
Reports for the year 1981 were checked for any reported foreign sales. 
This screening produced 75 domestic corporations for the 1966-70 
period; 108 for the 1972-76 period; and 119 for the 1977-81 period. 
These samples of domestic corporations are different from those 
used by other researchers [Hughes, Logue and Sweeney (1975); Senchak 
and Beedles (1980)] in that they contain only corporations which are 
purely domestic, i.e., with no foreign involvement at all. 
Specific Procedures 
Portfolio Construceion 
Using a unifo rm random number generator and the monthly return 
data, 130 portfolios were constructed for each of the 3 samples i n 
each of the 3 time periods. The random selection of securities for 
portfolio construction was done with replacement . These 130 
portfolios for each sample consisted of 10 portfolios each of sizes 2 
through 10, 15, 20, 25 and 30. It is assumed in constructing these 
portfolios that equal dollar amounts are invested in each security in 
a portfolio. 
For each sample, besides the 130 portfolios mentioned above, one 
more portfolio was constructed which included all the stocks in that 
sample. 
Johnson and Shannon (1974) have shown that equal weighting o f 
stocks does not produce the best portfolio performance. The purpose 
of this project, however, is to determine if it requires fewer MNC 
stocks than domestic stocks for an investor to reach the market l evel 
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of r isk, thereby resulting in reduced management and transaction 
costs. Techniques such as quadratic programming, which are u s ed to 
determine optimal weights for better portfolio performance, increase 
management costs. Optimizing with respect to proportionate 
investments in securities may be undesirable when transaction costs 
are considered. Investors may rationally choose to devote more 
attention to the selection of securities rather than to the particular 
proportions in which to hold them when both transaction costs and 
taxes dictate infrequent revisions. Equal weight i ng of stocks is 
therefore justified for purposes of this study. 
Measuring Portfolio Performance 
The portfolio construction method resulted in 10 portfolios of 
each size for each of the domestic , MNC and OMNC categories . For each 
portfolio, the arithmetic mean monthly return over the 60 month t est 
period and the standard deviation were computed. Grand means of the 
10 mean r e turns and means of the 10 standard deviations for each 
portfolio size were then calculated. These results were used as the 
mean return and standard deviation for each portfolio size. This 
procedure was adopted to smooth out any deviations caused by the 
random selection of securities. 
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The monthly portfolio returns for each of the 130 portfolios in 
the domestic, MNC and OMNC categories were regressed against the CRSP 
monthly index returns to determine the beta and the coefficient of 
determination (R2). The mean of the betas and R2s for the 10 
portfolios of each s i ze gave the beta and R2 for tha t size. The mean, 
standard deviation, beta, and R2 were also computed for the all-stock 
portfolios in each sample. 
Arithmetic Mean. For all the computations involving the mean, 
the arithmetic mean was used in this study rather than the geometr ic 
mean. The justification for this is as follows. The mean return of a 
portfolio is essentially its expected rate of return. As Sharpe 
(1970) observed , "to predict the future , possible outcomes a re 
assigned weights on the basis of their probabilities of occurence. To 
summarize the past, outcomes are assigned weights on the basis of 
their relative frequencies of occurence. The expected rate of r eturn 
is found by mult i pl ying ev ery possib le rate of return by its relativ e 
frequency of occurence. 11 9 The a rithmetic mean is thus the logical 
measure to calculate the expected return of a portfolio. 
The total risk of a portfolio, measured by its variance, or the 
square root of variance, standard deviation, is made up of systematic 




p 6~ 13p + RVAR ( 1 ) 
is the variance of the portfolio, \3p the beta of the 
portfolio, (J~ the variance of the market and RVAR the residual 
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variance. represents the systematic risk of the portfolio 
and RVAR the unsystematic risk. Using this formula, the risk of the 
portfolios of each size for all the samples was decomposed into its 
parts. For other tests in this study, standard deviation was used as 
a measure of total risk instead of variance. 
Risk/Re~urn Analy~is 
The coefficient of variation (CV) is use d as a measure of 
relative dispersion in this study to compare the risk/return 
performance of domestic, MNC and OMNC portfolios. Admittedly, the CV 
is a crude measure of relative risk. However, it is also a simple and 
an intuitive measure, and will suffice in this instance for broad 
comparisons of the performance of the three categories during the 
three test periods . The CV is computed using the following formula: 
6p -C\J = ( 2) '( 
where is the standard deviation of the portfolio and'( the 
return on the portfolio. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The primary objective of this study was to determine whether , to 
reduce total portfolio risk to the level of the U.S. ma rket risk, 
fewer MNC stocks would be required as compared to s tocks of domestic 
corporations. Total risk is measured by the standard deviation of 
returns over the test period. Tables V, VI and VII (Appendix A) 
contain the findings of this study in this context. 
During the 1966-70 period, a portfolio with only 3 OMNC stocks 
attained the same l evel of total risk as the market portfolio, as 
represented by the standard deviation of all the firm contained in the 
CRSP index. Six MNC stocks were needed to reach this risk level. 
Beyond the 6-stock level, the total risk of MNC and OMNC portfolios 
was less than the total risk of the market portfolio. The entire 
sample of 75 domestic stocks, however, still had a standard deviation 
higher than that of the market portfolio. 
Five OMNC stocks were required to attain the market risk level in 
the 1972-76 period. It took 7 MNC stocks to reduce portfolio standard 
deviation to that level. The portfolio consisting of all 109 domestic 
s tocks was not able to reduGe its risk to the level of the market 
portfolio. 
During the 1977-81 period, 6 stocks o f OMNCs were needed to reach 
the market risk level. Twenty MNC stocks were required before this 
level was reached. Once again, the entire sample of 119 domestic 
stocks had a standard deviation higher than that of the market portfolio. 
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These results support the hypothesis that fewer MNC stocks are 
needed, as compared to domestic stocks, to reach the level of total 
risk given by the market portfolio. This finding can be explained as 
follows; the systematic risk of an investment or portfolio has been 
shown to consist of components based on national and world markets. 
MNCs, due to their operations in several nations, may be diversifying 
away some of the national market risk. This would result in lower 
total risk as compared to domestic corporations. Also, the economies 
that various MNCs operate in are not perfectly correlated with each 
other. Thus the returns on the stocks of MNCs should not be highly 
corre lated to each other. Since portfolios consisting of less 
correlated investments have lower total risk as compared to portfolios 
consisting of more highly correlated investments, it is logical that 
MNC portfolios should have lower total risk than domestic portfolios 
of comparable size. 
Continuing Multinationality 
The OMNC samples were used in this study to determine whether the 
continuing multinationality of a MNC had any effect on the risk 
characteristics of its stock. Continuting multinationality does seem 
to be of some importance for risk reduction, as indicated by the 
results given in Tables V, VI and VII (Appendix A). 
Fewer OMNC stocks were required as compared to MNC stocks to 
attain a given total risk level. For example, in the 1966-70 period, 
25 MNC stocks had a standard deviation that was 20 percent below the 
standard deviation of the market portfolio. Only 6 OMNC stocks were 
needed to achieve this level. In 1972-76, 10 MNC stocks were needed to 
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attain a risk level 15 percent below that of the market portfolio. 
Only 7 OMNC stocks were required to achieve this level of 
diversification. During 1977-81, a portfolio with 25 MNC stocks had a 
total risk 10 percent below the risk of the market portfolio. Only 10 
OMNC stocks were needed to achieve this risk level. 
The reasons why MNC portfolios h ave provided lower total risk 
levels as compared to domestic portfolios were outlined above. The 
same arguments can be extended to explain why OMNC portfolios 
provided lower total risk levels as compared to MNC portfolios. OMNCs 
are MNCs that were MNCs through the test period. This means that over 
the test period, OMNCs had a more consistent, if not greater, foreign 
involvement as compared to MNCs. International operations being the 
reason for the lower total risk provided by MNC portfolios as compared 
to domestic portfolios, it follows that a greater degree of 
international operations should result in greater risk reduction 
benefits. The lower total risk provided by OMNC portfolios as 
compared to MNC portfolios is therefore not surprising. 
Time Periods 
The risk reduction performance of domestic, MNC and OMNC stocks 
is compared in this study during three different time periods to 
ascertain if there were any changes in the risk reduction 
char acter istics of t hese categor ies over time . The r esults shown in 
Tables V, VI and VII indicate that some changes have occured. For 
example, only 6 MNC stocks were required to reach the level of risk of 
the market portfolio during 1966-70. Seven MNC stocks were needed to 
do the same in 1972-76, and this number rose to 20 in 1977-81. 
The increasing economic integration of world economies [Barone 
(1983)] during the late 1970s could have resulted i n an increase in 
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the correlations b e tween MNC stocks. Hence the increase in the number 
of securities needed to reach the risk level of the market portfolio 
between the first and the last test period. 
OMNC portfolios almost always had a lower risk than both domestic 
and MNC portfolios of the same size. However, the difference between · 
the risk of the OMNC and MNC portfolios of similar s ize was greater in 
the 1977-81 period compared to other periods. This greater difference 
was attributable to an increase in the risk of MNCs relative to OMNCs. 
This seems to suggest that the influence of multinationality on the 
risk characteristics of MNC stocks was greater during 1977-81 than in 
1966-70 or 1972-76. 
The increasing economic integration of world economies could also 
have been the cause for this finding. The degree of foreign 
involvement of an MNC is obviously important to the risk reduction 
benefits of its stocks as evidenced by the lower risk levels produced 
by OMNC portfolios as compared to MNC portfolios. Given the decrease 
in overall risk reduction benefits from international involvement in 
1977-81, a greate r degree of international involvement may have been 
needed to produce the same level of risk reduction benefits as in the 
earlier two test periods. Thus the widened gap in the risk level s of 
MNC and OMNC portfolios in the last test pe rio d. 
Graphical Analysis 
Portfolio sta nda rd deviation is plotted a gainst portfolio size 
in Figures 1, 2 and 3 (Appendix B). An interesting c omparison can be 
made at this juncture to Solnik's (1974) study on international 
portfolio diversification. Solnik found that the total risk of an 
international portfolio was much lower than that of a domestic 
portfolio of the same size. The same relationship was found in t his 
study for both MNC and OMNC portfolios compared to domestic 
portfolios. MNC and OMNC portfolios always had a lower total risk 
than domestic portfolios of the same size. 
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Solnik also observed that while increasing the size of a domestic 
portfolio beyond 20 stocks seemed to achieve only a relatively small 
incremental reduction in risk, a substantial reduction could still be 
achieved for an international portfolio of the same size. This 
finding of Solnik, however, was not observed for the MNC and OMNC 
portfolios in this study. Beyond the 20-stock level, incremental 
reductions in risk were small for all portfolios, domestic, MNC and OMNC. 
For instance, the addition of 80 stocks to a 30-stock portfolio of 
MNCs during 1972-76 resulted in a reduction of risk of only 4 
percentage points (Table VI, Appendix A). Further, the portfolios 
consisting of all sample stocks for each of the three categories 
during each of the three time periods had total risk of only a few 
p ercentage points less than the respective 30-stock portfolios. 
MNC and OMNC portfolios had an initially lower level of total 
r i sk as compared to domestic portfolios. For instance, at the 2-stock 
level during 1966-70, domestic portfolios had a standard deviation 
equivalent to 229 percent of the market portfolio. The comparable 
figures for MNC and OMNC portfolios at the 2-stock level were 133 
percent and 108 percent respectively. Due to this initial low level 
of total risk, MNC and OMNC portfolios were able to reduce risk with 
fewer stocks than required by domestic portfolios. MNC and OMNC 
portfolios reached the level of risk of the market portfolio with 
fewer securities as compared to domestic portfolios in all three test 
periods. 
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Given the initial risk level at portfolio size 2, however, 
domestic stocks had a steeper slope of risk r eduction. That is, 
domestic portfolios had a higher rate of risk reduction between 
portfolio sizes 2 and 30. Still however, total risk of domestic 
portfolios was higher than MNC and OMNC portfolios for every portfolio 
size. 
Rate of Risk Reduction 
To measure the rate of risk reduction between portfolio sizes 2 
and 30, the following equation was fitted: 
( 3) 
Where'() is the number Of StOCkS in the portfolio, o/.... the intercept 
term, '"-6 the rate of risk reduction and e the error term. '6 has a 
negative sign in all cases because total risk is reduced as the number 
of stocks in a portfolio is i ncreased. The absolute magnitude of 'o 
measures the rate of risk reduction between portfolio sizes 2 and 301 
the higher this magnitude, the greater is the rate of risk reduction. 
Table VIII (Appendix A) gives the 'o coefficients for the three 
types of portfolios during the three test periods. These coefficients 
seem to indicate that in all three time periods, the rate of risk 
reduction for domestic portfolios was greater between portfolio sizes 
2 and 30 as compared to MNC and OMNC portfolios. 
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Chow Test 
A Chow test 10 was performed to test whether the differences in 
the intial levels of risk and the rate of risk reduction of domestic, 
MNC and OMNC portfolios were statistically significant. The Chow test 
examines the slopes and intercepts of the three regression line s 
[Figures 1, 2 and 3 (Appendix B)) in each time period for 
statistically significant differences. 
The Chow test indicated that at the .05 signif i cance level, the 
slope and intercept of the domestic portfolios was significantly 
different from MNC and OMNC portfolios during 1966-70 and 1977-81. 
During 1972-76, the risk reduction pattern of domestic portfolios was 
significantly different at the .05 level f r om OMNC portfolios but not 
MNC portfolios. There were no statistically significant differences 
at the .05 level in the slopes and intercepts of MNC and OMNC 
portfolios during any time period. 
Systematic and Unsystematic Ris k 
Beta Coefficients 
The average beta for domestic portfolios for all three time 
periods was 1.03. MNC portfolios had an average beta of 0.81 a nd OMNC 
portfolios an average beta of 0.75. The fact that MNC and OMNC 
po r tfolios had lower betas than domes tic portfo lios, when a domesti c 
market index was used, is in agreement with the findings of several 
previous researchers [Hughes, Logue and Sweeney (1975); Agga rwal 
(1979); and Mikhail and Shawky (1979)). 
Proportions of systematic and unsystematic RisR 
Tables IX, X and XI (Appendix A) give the percentages of 
systematic and unsystematic risk to the total risk of the portfolio 
as portfolio size increases. Here, total risk is measured by 
systematic risk by 6~ lap, and unsystematic risk by RVAR as shown 
equation ( 1). 
Just as portfolio theory hypothesizes, unsystematic risk is 
in 
reduced as the number of stocks in the portfolio increases. For each 
of the three types of portfolios, unsystematic risk is reduced from 
approximately 50 percent of total risk at the 2-stock level to about 
15 percent of total risk at the 30-stock level. 
A comparison of the percentages of systematic and unsystematic 
risk between the three categories of portfolios reveals that domestic 
portfolios have lower levels of unsystematic risk at the 30-stock 
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level than MNC and OMNC portfolios. In 1966-70, at the 30-stock level, 
the total risk of a domestic portfolio consisted of 88 percent 
systematic and 12 percent unsystematic risk, The comparable figures 
for MNC portfolios were 79 percent systematic and 21 percent 
unsystematic risk. OMNC portfolios had 76 percent s ystematic and 24 
percent unsystematic risk at the 30-stock level. Tables IX , X and XI 
give similar data for 1972-76 and 1977-81. 
The market rewards only the systematic risk of a security or 
portfolio, since unsystematic risk can be diversified away, Thus 
portfolio diversification can be said to be efficient if a portfolio 
has a very s mall propor tion of unsystematic risk, Using this 
definition o f por t fo lio efficiency, together with a domestic index, i t 
can be said that domestic portfolios diversified risk more efficiently 
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than MNC or OMNC portfolios. 
Risk/Return Performance 
The mean monthly return, standard deviation and coefficient of 
variation (CV) for domestic, MNC and OMNC portfolios are given in 
Tables XII through XX (Appendix A). CV is a measure of relative risk, 
i.e., it meas ures the units of risk p e r unit of return. The lower the 
CV of a portfo lio, the better is its total risk/return performance. 
T-tests were performed for each time period to examine whether 
the average CVs of domestic, MNC and OMNC portfolios statistically 
differed from each other. The t-tests indicated that during 1966-70, 
the mean CVs of domestic and MNC portfolios and MNC and OMNC 
portfolios were not significantly different. The mean CV of the OMNC 
portfolios, however, was significantly different at the .05 level f rom 
the mean CV of domestic portfolios, with the OMNC portfolios having a 
lower CV. This means that OMNC portfolios performed better than 
domestic portfolios in a total risk/return sense during 1966-70. 
During 1972-76, none of the mean CVs were significantly different 
from each other. The performance of MNC and OMNC portfolios was thus 
not statistically different from each other or from domestic 
portfolios. 
In the 1977-81 period, the mean CVs of domestic, MNC and OMNC 
portfolios were significantly different from each other at the ,01 
level. The mean CV of domestic portfolios was lower than that of MNC 
and OMNC portfolios, This means that domestic portfolios performed 
better in a total risk/return sense in 1977-81. Also, MNC portfolios 
had a lower CV than OMNC portfolios, which indicates that MNC 
portfolios performed better than OMNC portfolios. During the 1977-81 
period, therefore, multinationality seems to have had a negative 
impact on performance, The reason for this finding merits further 
investigation. It can be said, however, that the rising value of the 
dollar against several international currencies during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s could have resulted in lower profitability and hence 
lower returns on MNC stocks. 11 
Comparison with previous findings 
so 
The results of this study supported the findings of Klemkosky and 
Martin (1975) regarding beta's effect on portfolio diversification. 
The high beta domestic portfolios required a greater number of 
securities to attain a given level of diversification as compared to 
the low beta MNC and OMNC portfolios. 
Jacquillat and Solnik (1978) reported that the standard deviation 
of MNC portfolios was usually 90 percent of that of purely domestic 
portfolios of the same size. In this study, MNC portfolios had a 
standard deviation approximately 70 percent of that of domestic 
portfolios of the same size over all the three time periods. This 
percentage varied from 64 in 1966-70 to 78 in 1972-76 and 67 in 
1977-81. The OMNC portfolios had a even lower percentage; 62 overall, 
55 during 1966-70, 73 during 1972-76 and 57 during 1977-81, 
Hughes, Logue and Sweeney (1975) found that MNC portfolios had 
lower levels of systematic, unsystematic and total risk as compared to 
domestic portfolios, regardless of the index used. The findings of 
this research support Hughes , et al,'s observations in that MNC 
and OMNC portfolios had lower levels of systematic, unsystematic and 
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total risk as compared to domestic portfolios. 
From a risk/return point of view, however, it appears that the 
results of this study are inconclusive. Mikhail and Shawky (1979) and 
Logue (1982) used standard deviation as the measure of risk and found 
that MNC portfolios performed better than either domestic portfolios 
or a domestic index. During 1966-70, the OMNC portfolios in this 
study performed better than domestic portfolios in a risk/return 
sense; risk was also measured by standard deviation for this purpose 
in this study. In none of the other time periods, however, did the 
MNC and OMNC portfolios perform significantly better than domestic 
portfolios in this study. In contrast, domestic portfolios performed 
significantly better than MNC and OMNC portfolios during 1977-81. The 
findings on risk/return performance in this study cannot be compared 
to several other studies [Hughes, Logue and Sweeney (1975); Senchak 
and Beedles (1980) and Brewer (1981)] due to differences in either the 
measure of ris k used or the methodology employed. 
Conclusion 
The findings o f this study are of value to an investor who seeks 
to reduce the total risk of his/her investments to the level of risk 
of the U.S. market. This study has shown that such an objective can 
be reached with fewer stocks of MNCs as compared to stocks of purely 
domestic corporations. Holding fewer securities means a reduction in 
transaction and manageme nt costs, which improves the net return on 
the investment. The investor can reduce the number of stocks in the 
portfolio eve n further if he/she ensures that the portfolio consists 
of firms that remain MNCs through the entire holding period. 
This study has not provided conclusive evidence on whether MNC 
portfolios perform better than domestic portfolios. Also, the number 
of MNC stocks needed to reach the market level of risk seems to be 
increasing over time. Further research is needed to discern the 
effect of international economic integration, if any, on the risk 
reduction characteristics of multinational portfolios. 
Inspite of the controversy whether MNCs provide a indirect 
vehicle for international diversification, this study has shown that 
an inves tor could still benefit through investment in MNCs because of 
a reduction in transaction costs that results from fewer MNC stock s 
being needed to attain the market level of risk. 
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Notes 
See Brewer (1981), p. 114. 
2 
See Brewer ( 1981), p. 114. 
3 
Excess market value is defined by Errunza and Senbet as the 
differe nce between total firm value (market value of equity and book 
value of debt) and book value of assets, normalized by sales. See 
Thomadakis (1977) for further details on this definition. 
4 
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Standard and Poor•s outlook 44:34 (August 21, 1972): 594-598. 
5 
Standard and Poor•s Outlook 50:33 (August 14, 1978): 611-614. 
6 
Standard and Poor•s outlook 43:36 (September 6, 1971): 508-509. 
7 
The 100 Largest u.s. Multinationals. Forbes 130 (July 5, 1982): 
126-128. 
8 
Directory of American Firms . operating in Foreign countries. 
Juvenal L. Angel, compiler. New York: Uniworld Business Publications, 
1979. 
9 
See Sharpe (1970), p. 142. 
10 
See Chow, G. c., Tests of the Equality between Sets of 
Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions. Econometrica 28 (July 1960): 
591-605. 
11 
See Business week (August 17, 1981): 98. 
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CORRELATIONS OF FOREIGN STOCK MARKETS 
WITH THE U.S. MARKET 
Grubel ( 1968) Solnik (1973) Lessard (1975) 
Stock Market 
1959-66 1966-71 1959-73 
Australia .06 
Austria 
Belgium , 11 ,47 
Canada ,70 
Denmark 
France • 19 .06 
Germany ,30 ,22 
Italy , 15 .07 
Japan • 11 .19 





United Kingdom ,24 .20 
Source: Gary L, Bergstrom, "A New Route to Higher Returns 
and Lower Risks," Jour nal of Portfolio Managemen1:. 


















INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIOS--PERFORMANCE SUM.t1ARY 
MARCH 1971 TO JUNE 1974 
Total International Portfolio Return 
S & P 500 -- Total Return 
NYSE Composite -- Total Return 
U.S. Growth Funds Average (21 Funds) 
U.S. Common Stock Funds Average (24 Funds) 
Standard Deviation of International Portfolios 
(per week) 
Standard Deviation of NYSE Composite (per week) 
Beta Coefficient versus NYSE Composite 
R2 versus NYSE Composite 
+ 30. 8 % 
+ 11.6 % 







Source: Gary L . Bergstrom, "A New Route to Higher 
Return s and Lower Risks." Journal of Por"C.folio 
Management (Fall 1975): P• 31. 
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TABLE III 
PERFORMANCE OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS RELATIVE TO 
DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS 
1963-1972 
MNC Domesti c 
Industry 
Non-ferrous Metals 














18. 1 6.8 
19.3 9.0 
17. 9 10.4 




Beta Ret. s.o. 
1. 31 14.7 9.3 
1. 71 16.8 10.2 
1.17 21.8 s.o 
1. 50 15.8 8.7 
0.60 19.6 11.6 
o. 77 9.9 5.6 
0.77 12.3 7.2 









0 . 65 
1. 12 
(t significant at the .OS level) (n.c. = not c omputed) 
Sour ce: Theodore Koher s, "A Risk-Return Comparison: u.s. 
Mul tinational and u.s. Domestic Corporations." 
university of Michigan Bus i~ess Revie~ 28:2 











MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND COEFFICIENTS OF 
VARIATION OF RETURNS OF THIRTY MNCS AND 
S&P 500 INDEX 
1968-1975 
MNCs S&P 
Mean s.o. CV Mean S.D. 
0.0146 0.0428 2.93 0.0097 0.0308 
-0.0067 0.0340 -5.07 0.0125 0.0295 
0.0110 0.0526 4.78 -0.0009 0.0478 
0.0127 0.0473 3. 72 0.0589 0.0339 
o.0178 0.0275 1. 54 0.0144 0.0210 
-0.0114 0,0562 -4.93 -o.0172 0.0333 
-0.0124 0.068 7 -5.54 -0.0273 0,0492 
0,0286 0.0587 2 . os 0.0247 0,0498 
Source: Azmi D, Mikhail and Hany A, Shawky, 
"Investment Performance of U.S. Based Multinational 
Corporations." Journal of International Business 












REDUCTION IN TOTAL RISK AS THE NUMBER OF 




















Enti re sample 109 
The sample sizes were: Domestic: 75 
MNC: 47 


















REDUCTION I N TOTAL RISK AS THE NUMBER OF 















1 0 117 
1 5 115 
20 115 
2 5 107 
3 0 106 
Entire sample 105 
The samp le s i zes were: Domescic: 109 
MNC: 110 








9 9 93 
89 8 4 
85 94 







REDUCTION IN TOTAL RISK AS THE NUMBER OF 

















2 0 156 
25 149 
30 139 
Entir e samp le 134 
The s ampl e sizes were: Domestic : 11 9 
MNC: 131 
OMNC : 59 
MNC OMNC 
163 173 
















RATE OF RISK REDUCTION 
( '""6 coefficients ) 
1966-70 1972-76 1977-81 
Domestic -2.4940 -1,7765 -2,9285 
MNC -1.3269 -1.2821 -1.9406 


















SYSTEMATIC AND UNSYSTEMATIC RISK AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL RISK 
(1966-1970) 
Domestic MNC 
Sy s. Unsys. Sys. Unsys . 
52 48 54 46 
57 43 54 46 
64 36 56 44 
68 32 64 36 
79 21 67 33 
68 32 64 36 
76 24 70 30 
77 23 71 29 
76 24 67 33 
83 17 77 23 
85 15 79 21 
88 12 81 19 



































SYSTEMATIC AND UNSYSTEMATIC RISK AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL RISK 
( 1972-1976) 
Domes-c.ic MNC 
Sys. Unsys. Sys. Unsys. 
46 54 44 56 
57 43 54 46 
66 34 63 37 
67 33 66 34 
72 28 67 33 
69 31 67 33 
74 26 73 27 
81 19 67 33 
84 16 71 29 
83 17 79 21 
89 11 74 26 
90 10 80 20 



































SYSTEMATIC AND UNSYSTEMATIC RISK AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL RISK 
( 1977-1981) 
Domestic MNC 
Sys. Unsys. Sys. Unsys. 
48 52 47 53 
56 44 55 45 
60 40 63 37 
66 34 64 36 
73 27 71 29 
71 29 71 29 
73 27 74 26 
72 28 79 21 
79 21 75 25 
84 16 79 21 
88 12 81 19 
91 9 84 16 



















MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION, AND COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION 










































































MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION, AND COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION 










































































MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION, AND COEFFIC I ENT OF VARIATION 










































0. 0 526 
0.0505 
0.0497 




0 . 0489 
0,0464 
0.0468 




of variatio n 
26,2727 
7 . 6164 
8.9152 














MEAN , STANDARD DEVIATION, AND COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION 







































































10. 16 90 
75 
TABLE XVI 
MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION, AND COEFFICIENT OF VARI ATION 










































































MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION, AND COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION 
























































of variatio n 
9.5500 
17. 4 130 
9,90 54 














MEAN , STANDARD DEVIATION, AND COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION 












































































MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION, AND COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION 









































































MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION, AND COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION 























































Coe ff ic ient. 
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LISTS OF CORPORATIONS 
BS 
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LIST OF DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS 
1966-1970 
1. Alpha Portland Inds Inc. 
2. American Bakeries Co. 
3. American Ship Bldg Co. 
4. Amstar Corp. 
5. Armada Corp. 
6. Armstrong Rubr Co. 
7. Belding Heminway Inc. 
8. Benguet Corp. 
9. Bobbie Brooks Inc. 
10. Briggs & Stratton Corp. 
11. Brown Group Inc. 
12. Callahan Mng Corp. 
13. Campbell Red Lake Mines Co. 
14. Capital Cities Cornrnns . 
15. Carling Okeefe Co. 
16. Carlisle Corp. 
17. Ceco Corp. 
18. Chock Full O Nuts Corp. 
19. Coastal Corp. 
2 0. Cone Mls Corp. 
21. Conwood Corp. 
22. Cooper Tire & Rubr Co. 
23. Cyclops Corp. 
24. Dan River Inc. 
25. De Soto Inc. 
26. Dome Mines Co. 
27. Donnelley RR & Sons Co. 
· 28. Eagle Picher Inds I nc. 
29. Eastern Gas & Fue l Assoc. 
30. Federal Paper Brd Inc. 
31. Fuqua Inds Inc. 
32. Giant Portland & Mas Cem. 
33. Great Northn Nekoosa Corp 
34. HM W Inds Inc. 
35. Hammermill Paper Co. 
36. Holly Sugar Corp. 
37. Hudson Bay Mng & Smlt Co. 
38. Ingr edient Tech Corp. 
39. Interpace Corp. 
40. Keller Inds Inc. 
41. Kroehler Mfg Co. 
42, Loral Corp. 
43. Lowe nstei n M Corp. 
44. Lukens Stl Co. 
4 5. M E I Corp. 
46 . Manhattan Inds Inc. 
47 . McIntyre Mines Co. 
48 . Meredith Corp. 
87 
(Continued) 
49. Mesta Mach Co. 75. Wheeling Pitt Stl Co r p . 
SO. National Stl Corp. 
51. National Svc Inds Inc. 
52. North Amern Coal Corp. 
53. Northwest Inds Inc. 
54. Northwestn Stl & Wire Co. 
55. Opelika Mfg Corp. 
56. Oxford Inds Inc. 
57. Phillips Van Heusen Corp . 
58. Quanex Corp. 
59. Rap Roper Corp. 
60. Russ Togs Inc. 
61. SP S Tech Inc . 
62. SFN Cos Inc. 
63. Smucker J M Co. 
64. Southeastn Pub Svc Co . 
65. Stone Container Corp. 
66. Stride Rite Corp. 
67. Sunshine Mng Co. 
68. Texas Inds Inc. 
69. u N C Res Inc. 
70. u N R Inds Inc. 
71. United Sts Tab Co. 
72. Vista Res Inc. 
73. Walter Jim Corp. 
74. Wayne Gossard Corp. 
LIST OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
1966-1970 
1 • Abbott Labs 
2, American Cyanamid Co, 
3. Amp Inc. 
4. Avon Products Inc, 
5. Black & Decker Mfg Co, 
6. Boise Cascade Corp, 
7. Caterpillar Tractor Co, 
8. Celanese Corp, 
9. Chesebrough Ponds Inc. 
10. Chrysler Corp, 
11. Clark Equipment Co. 
12. Colgate Palmolive Co, 
13. Crown Zellerbach Corp. 
14. Dow Chemical Co, 
15. Eastman Kodak Co, 
16. Ford Motor Co. 
17. Foster Wheeler Corp, 
18, W,R, Grace & Co. 
19, Ingersoll Rand Co. 
20. Intl Business Machs, 
21. Intl Harvester Co. 
22. Intl Minerals & Chem. 
23, Intl Tel & Teleg Corp. 
24, Johnson & Johnson 
25. Joy Mfg Co, 
26, Kaiser Alum & Chem Corp, 
27, Merck & Co. Inc, 
28, Minnes ota Mng & Mfg Co. 
29. Mobil Corp, 
30, Monsanto Co, 
31. Murphy Oil Corp. 
32. N C R Corp, 
33. Norton Co. 
34. Pfizer Inc. 
35. Quaker Oats Co. 
36. Reynolds Metals Co, 
37. Schering Plough Corp, 
38, Singer Co. 
39. Standard Oil Co. 
40. Sterling Drug Inc. 
41. Texaco Inc, 
42, Texas Instrs Inc. 
43. Union Carbide Corp. 
44. United Sts Inds Inc. 
45, Upjohn Co, 
46. Warner Lambert Co. 
47. Westinghouse Elec Corp. 
88 
LIST OF ONGOING MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
1966-1970 
1 • Abbott Labs 
2. American Cyanamid Co. 
3. Amp Inc. 
4. Avon Products Inc. 
5 . Black & Decker Mfg Co. 
6. Chesebrough Ponds Inc. 
7. Chrysler Corp. 
8. Colgate Palmolive Co. 
9. Dow Chemical Co. 
10. Eastman Kodak Co. 
11. Ford Motor Co. 
12. W.R. Grace & Co. 
13. Intl Business Machs. 
14. Intl Harvester Co. 
15, Intl Minerals & Chem. 
16. Intl Tel & Teleg Corp. 
17. Johnson & Johnson 
18. Joy Mfg Co. 
19. Merck & Co Inc. 
20. Minnesota Mng & Mfg Co. 
21. Mobil Corp. 
22. Monsanto Co. 
23. N C R Cor p. 













Reynolds Metals Co. 
Schering Plough Corp. 
Singer Co. 
Standard Oil Co. 
Sterling Drug Inc. 
Texaco Inc. 
Texas Instrs Inc, 
Union Carbide Corp. 
Up john Co. 
Warner Lambert Co. 
89 
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LIST OF DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS 
1972-1976 
1. A P L Corp. 24. Cone Mls Corp. 
2. Aileen Inc. 25. Conwood Corp. 
3. Alpha Portland Ind Inc. 26. Cooper Tire & Rubr Co. 
4. American Bakeries Co. 27. Core Inds Inc. 
5. American Ship Bldg Co. 28. Cyclops Corp. 
6. Amstar Corp. 29. Dan River Inc. 
7. Apache Corp. 30. De Soto Inc. 
8. Armstrong Rubr Co. 31. Dome Mines Co. 
9. Athlone Inds Inc. 32. RR Donnelley & Sons Co. 
10. Belding Heminway Inc. 33. Eagle Picher Inds Inc. 
11. Benguet Corp. 34. Eastern Gas & Fuel Assoc. 
12. Blair John & Co. 35. Ennis Business Forms Inc. 
13. Bobbie Brooks Inc. 36. Esquire Inc. 
14. Briggs & Stratton Corp. 37. Federal Co. 
15. Brockway Glass Co. 38. Federal Paper Brd Inc. 
16. Brown Group Inc. 39. Federal Signal Corp. 
17. Callahan Mng Corp. 40. Florida Stl Inc. 
18. Campbell Red Lake Min Co. 41. Fuqua Inds Inc. 
19. Capital Cities Commn. 42. Gannett Inc. 
20. Carlisl e Corp. 43. Genstar Corp. 
21. Ceco Cor p. 4 4 . Giant Portland & Masonary 
22 . Chelsea Inds Inc . 45. Great Northn Nekoosa Corp 
23. Chock Full O Nuts Corp . 46. HM W Inds inc. 
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(Com:inued) 
47. Hammermill Paper Co. 73. Northwestern Stl & Wire 
48. Holly Sugar Corp. 74. Norton Simon Inc. 
49. Interspace Corp. 75. Oxford Inds Inc. 
50. Int State Bakeries Corp. 76. Phillips Van Heusen Corp. 
51. Kane Miller Corp. 77. Quanex Corp. 
52. keller Inds Inc. 78 . RTE Corp. 
53. Knight Ridder Newsp Inc. 79. Roper Corp. 
54. Loral Corp. 80. Russ Togs Inc. 
55. Lowenstein M Corp. 81. SP S Technologies Inc. 
56. Lukens Stl Co. 82. Safeguard Scientif~cs 
57. ME I Corp. 83. SFN Cos Inc. 
SB. Manhattan Inds Inc. 84. Skyline Corp. 
59. Marion Labs Inc. 85. Southdown Inc. 
60. McIntyre Mines Co. 86. Stone Container Corp. 
61. Meredith Corp. 87 . Stride Rite Corp. 
62. Mesta Mach Co. 88 . Sunshine Mng Co. 
63. Monogram Inds Inc. 89. Swank Inc. 
64. Murray Ohio Mfg Co. 90. TR E Corp . 
65. National Presto Inds Inc. 91. Telex Corp. 
66. National Stl Corp. 92. Texas I nds Inc. 
67. National Svc Inds Inc. 93. Texfi Inds Inc. 
68. NCH Corp. 94. Todd Shipyards Corp. 
6 9 . Newh a ll LO & Farming Co. 95. Triangle Inds Inc. 
70. North Amern Coal Corp. 96. Triangle Pac Corp. 
71. Nor t hgate Expl Co . 97 . UN C Res Inc , 
72. Northwest Inds Inc. 98. UN R Inds Inc. 
(Continued) 
99. Union Corp. 
100. United Sts Tab Co. 
101. VF Corp. 
102. Vista Res Inc. 
103. Wallace Computer Services Inc. 
104. Walter Jim Corp. 
105, Watkins Johnson Co. 
106. Wayne Gossard Corp, 
107. Wheeling Pittsburgh Stl Corp, 
108, Winnebago Inds Inc, 
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LIST OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
1972-1976 
1 • Abbott Labs 
2. Acme Cleveland Corp. 
3. Alberto Culver Co. 
4. American Cyanamid Co. 
5, American Horne Prods Corp. 
6. American Std Inc, 
7. Aro Corp. 
8, Avon Prods Inc. 
9. Bausch & Lomb Inc, 
10. Baxter Travenol Labs Inc. 
11. Black & Decker Mfg Co, 
12. Borg Warner Corp, 
13, Bristol Myers Co. 
14. Brown & Sharpe Mfg Co. 
24. Chrysler Corp . 
25, Clark Equip Co, 
26, Coca Cola Co, 
27, Colgate Palmolive Co·, 
28. Control Data Corp. 
29. Corning Glass Wks. 
30, Cummins Engine Inc, 
31. Digital Equip Corp , 
32, Dow Chern Co. 
33, Eastman Kodak Co, 
34 . Eaton Corp. 
35. Emhart Corp, 
36, Ex Cell O Corp. 
37, Ferro Corp. 
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15. Brunswick Corp, 38. Firestone Tire & Rubr Co. 
16. Bucyrus Erie Co. 
17. Burroughs Corp. 
18. C PC Intl Inc. 
19. Cabot Corp . 
20, Caterpillar Tractor Co. 
21. Celanese Corp , 
22 . cnesebrough Ponds Inc. 
2 3. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co . 
39. Ford Motor Co. 
40, Foxboro Co, 
41, G c A Corp. 
4 2, General Foods Corp. 
43, General Instr Corp, 
44, W. R. Grace & Co. 
45. Hanna Mng Co, 
46 , HJ Heinz Co. 
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(Continued) 
47. Helene Cur tis Ind Inc. 73. Outboard Marine Corp. 
48. Hercules Inc. 74. Perkin Elmer Corp. 
49. Hewlett Packard Co. 75. Pfizer Inc. 
50. High Voltage Engr Corp. 76. Pitney Bowes Inc. 
51. Honeywell Inc. 77. Polaroid Corp. 
52. Intl Business Machs. 78. Proctor & Gamble Co . 
53. Intl Flavors & Frag. 79. Products Resh & Chem Corp 
54. Intl Harvester Co. 80. Quaker Oats Co. 
55. Intl Min & Chern. 81. Reynolds Metals Co. 
56. Intl Tel & Teleg Corp. 82. H H Robertson Co. 
57. Johnson & Jonnson 83. AH Rob ins Inc . 
58. Joy Mfg Co. 84. Rohm & Haas Co. 
59. Kellogg Co. 85. scnering Plough Corp. 
60. Kennametal Inc . 86. Schlumberger Inc. 
61. Levi Str auss & Co. 87. Scott Paper Co. 
62. Lubrizol Corp. 88. GD Searle & Co. 
63. Mcdermott Inc. 89. Simmonds Pree Prod I nc. 
64. Mer ck & Co Inc. 90. Singer Co. 
65. Minnesota Mng & Mfg Co. 91. Squibb Corp. 
66. Mohawk Data Scs Corp. 92. Stanley Wks. 
67. Monsanto Co . 93. LS Starr e t t Co. 
68. Murphy Oil Corp . 94. Sterling Drug Inc. 
6 9 . N C R Corp. 95. Sundstrand Corp. 
70. Nalco Chem Co. 96. Sybron Corp . 
71. Nashua Corp . 97. TR W Inc . 
72. Norton Co . 98. Tektronix Inc. 
(Continued) 
99. Texas Instruments Inc. 
100. Timken Co. 
101. Trane Co. 
102. Union Carbide Corp. 
103. Uniroyal Inc. 
104. Up john Co. 
105. Warner La mbert Co. 
106. Weyerhaeuser Co. 
107. Witco Chern Corp. 
108. WM Wrigley Jr Co. 
109. Xerox Corp. 
110. Zapata Corp. 
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LIST OF ONGOING MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
1972-1976 
1. Abbott Labs 
2. American Cyanamid Co. 
3. American Standard Inc. 
4. Avon Prods Inc. 
5. Baxter Travenol labs Inc. 
6. Black & Decker Mfg Co. 
7. Bor g-Warner Corp. 
8. Br i stol-Myers Co, 
9. Bucyrus-Erie Co, 
10. C PC Intl Inc, 
11, Cabot Corp, 
12, Caterpillar Tractor Co, 
13. Celanese Corp. 
14. Chesebrough Ponds Inc, 
15, Chica go Pneumatic Tool Co, 
16. Chrysler Corp, 
17. Clark Equip Co, 
18. Coca Cola Co, 
19, Control Data Corp, 
20. Cummins Engine Inc. 
21. Digital Equip Cor p, 
22. Dow Chem Co, 
23. Eastman Kodak Co, 
24, Eaton Corp, 
25, Ex Cello Corp. 
26, Firestone Tire & Ruhr Co, 
27, Ford Motor Co, 
28, Foxboro Co, 
29. General Foods Corp, 
30, Hercules Inc, 
31. Hewlett Packard Co, 
32, Honeywell Inc, 
33, Intl Business Machs, 
34, Intl Flavors & Frag. 
35. Intl Harvester Co, 
36, Intl Tel & Teleg Corp. 
37, Johnson & Jonnson 
38. Joy Mfg Co, 
39, Kellogg Co, 
40. Merck & Co Inc, 
41. Monsanto Co, 
42. N C R Corp. 
43. Nashua Corp, 
44. Outboard Mar ine Cor p, 
45, Perk in Elmer Cor p, 
46, Pfiz er Inc, 
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( Com::inued) 
47. Pitney Bowes Inc. 
48. Polaroid Corp. 
49. Rohm & Haas Co. 
50. Schering Plough Corp. 
51. Schlumberger Inc. 
52. Singer Co. 
53. Squibb Corp. 
54. Sundstrand Corp. 
55. Sybron Corp. 
56. TRW Inc. 
57. Texas Instrs Inc . 
58. Union Carbide Corp. 
59. Uniroyal Inc. 
60. Up john Co. 
61. Warner Lambert Co. 
62. Weyerhaeuser Co. 
63. Xerox Corp. 
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LIST OF DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS 
1977-1981 
1. A P L Corp. 24. Chelsea Inds Inc. 
2. Aileen Inc. 25. Chock Full O Nuts Corp. 
3. Alpha Portland Ind Inc. 26. Coastal Corp. 
4. American Bakeries Co. 27. Cone Ml s Corp. 
5. American Ship Bldg Co. 28. Conrac Corp . 
6. Amstar Corp. 29. Conwood Corp. 
7. Apache Corp. 30. Cooper Tire & Rub r Co. 
8. Armada Corp. 31. Core Inds Inc. 
9. Armstrong Rubr co. 32. Cyclops Corp. 
10. Athlone Inds Inc. 33. Dan River Inc. 
11. Belding Heminway Inc. 34. De Soto Inc. 
12. Benguet Corp. 35. Dome Mines Co. 
13. Blair John & Co. 36. RR Donnelley & Sons Co. 
14. Bobbie Brooks Inc. 37. Eagle Picher Inds tnc. 
15. Briggs & Stratton Corp. 38 . Eastern Gas & Fuel Assoc. 
16. Brockway Glass co. 39. Ennis Business Forms Inc. 
17. Brown Group Inc. 40. Esquire Inc. 
18. Callahan Mng Corp. 4 1. Federal Co. 
19. Campbell Red Lake Min Co. 42. Federal Paper Brd Inc, 
20. Capital Cities Comrnn. 43. Federal Signal Corp . 
21. Carling Okeefe Co. 44. Florida Stl Corp. 
22. Car lis l e Corp. 45. Gannett Inc. 
23. Ce co Corp. 46. Ge nstar Corp. 
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{Continued ) 
47. Giant Portland & Masonary 73. National Svc Inds Inc. 
48. Great Northn Nekoosa Corp. 74. NCH Corp. 
49. HM W Inds Inc. 75. Newhall LD & Farming Co. 
50. Hammermill Paper Co. 76. North Amern Coal Corp. 
51. Holly Sugar Corp. 77. Northgate Expl Co. 
52. Hudson Bay Mng & Smlt Co. 78. Northwest Inds Inc. 
53. IC N Pharmaceuticals Inc. 79. Northwestern Stl & Wire 
54. Interspace Corp. 80. Norton Simon Inc. 
55. Int State Bakeries Corp. 81. Opelika Mfg Corp. 
56. kane Miller Corp. 82. Oxford Inds Inc, 
57. Keller Inds Inc. 83. Phillips Van Heusen Corp. 
58. Knight Ridder Newsp Inc. 84. Quanex Corp. 
59. Kroehler Mfg Co. 85. RTE Corp. 
60. Loral Corp. 86. Redman Inds Inc. 
61. Lowenstein M Corp. 87. Roper Corp. 
62. Lukens Stl Co. 88. Russ Togs Inc, 
63. ME I Corp. 89 . SP S Technologies Inc. 
64. Manhattan Inds Inc. 90. Safeguard Scientifics 
65. Marion Labs inc. 91. SFN Cos Inc-. 
66. McIntyre Mines Co. 92. Skyline Corp. 
67. Meredith Corp. 93. Smucker J M Co. 
68. Mesta Mach Co. 94. Sout hdown Inc. 
69. Monogram Inds Inc. 95. Southeastern Pub Svc Co. 
70. Murray Ohio Mfg Co. 96. Southwest Forest Inds Inc 
71. National Presto Ind s Inc. 97. Stone Container Corp. 
72. National Stl Corp. 98. Stride Rite Corp. 
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(Continued) 
99. Sunshine Mng Co. 
100. Swank Inc. 
101. T R E Corp. 
102. Telex Corp. 
103. Texas Inds Inc. 
104. Texfi Inds Inc. 
105. Todd Shipyards Corp. 
106. Triangle Inds Inc. 
107. Triangle Pac Corp. 
108. U N C Res Inc. 
109. UN R Inds Inc. 
110. Union Corp. 
111. United Sts Tab Co. 
112. VF Corp. 
113. Vista Res Inc. 
114. Wallace Computer Services Inc. 
115. Walter Jim Corp. 
116. Watkins Johnson Co. 
117. Wayne Gossard Corp. 
118. Wheeling Pittsburgh Stl Corp. 
119. Winneb ago Inds Inc. 
LIST OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
1977-1981 
1. AMF Inc. 24, C PC Intl Inc. 
2. Abbott Labs 25. Cabot Corp. 
3. Air Prods & Chem Inc. 26. Castle & Cooke Inc. 
4. Allis Chalmers Corp. 27. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 
5. American Brands Inc, 28. Celanese Corp. 
6, American Cyanamid co. 29. Cessna Aircraft Co. 
7. Americ a n Hoist & Der Co. 30. Champion Spark Plug Co, 
8. American Std Inc, 31. Chesebrough Ponds Inc, 
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9. Archer Daniels Midlnd Co. 32. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co, 
10. Avon Prods Inc. 
11. Baker Intl Corp. 
12. Bally Mfg Corp. 
13. CR Bard Inc. 
14. Baxter Travenol Labs Inc. 
15. Beatrice Foods Co, 
16. Becton Dickinson & Co. 
17. Bell & Howell Co. 
18. Big Three Inds Inc. 
19, Black & Decker Mfg Co. 
20. Boeing Co. 
21. Borg Warner Corp. 
22. Bristol Mye rs Co. 
23. Bucyrus Erie Co. 
33. Chrysler Corp. 
34. Cincinnati Milacron Inc. 
35. Clark Equip Co. 
36. Coca Cola Co. 
37. Combustion Engr Inc. 
38. Control Data Corp. 
39. Cummins Engine Inc, 
40. Data Gen Corp. 
41. Deere & Co. 
42, Dexter Corp. 
43, Digital Equip Corp. 
44. Dow Chem Co. 
45, Dresser Inds Inc. 
46. EI Du Pont & Co. 
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47. Eastman Kodak Co. 73. Ingersoll Rand Co. 
48. Eato n Corp. 74. Intl Business Machs . 
49. Emer son Elec Co. 75. Intl Flavors & Frag. 
50. Ex Cell O Corp. 76. Intl Harvester Co. 
51. FMC Corp. 77. Intl Tel & Teleg Corp. 
52. Faberge Inc. 78. Johnson & Johnson 
53. Firestone Tire & Rubr Co. 79. Joy Mfg co. 
54. Fluor Corp. 80. Kellogg Co. 
55. Ford Motor Co. 81. Libbey Owens Ford Co. 
56. Foster Wheeler corp. 82. Litton Inds Inc. 
57. Foxboro Co. 83. Lockheed Corp. 
58. General Elec Co. 84. Mattel Inc. 
59. General Foods Corp. 85. Mc Donnell Douglas Corp. 
60. General Mtrs Corp. 86. Merck & Co Inc. 
61. Getty Oil Co. 87. Monsanto co. 
62. Gillette Co. 88. Motorola Inc. 
63. BF Goodrich Co. 89. NCR Corp. 
64. Goodyear Tire & Rubr Co. 90. Nashua Corp. 
65. Gulf Oil Corp. 91. Occidental Pete Corp. 
66. Halliburton Co. 92. Outboard Mar ine Corp. 
61. Harnischfeger Corp. 93. Perkin Elmer Corp. 
68. Hercules Inc. 94. Pfizer Inc. 
69. Hewlett Packard Co. 95. Philip Morris Inc. 
70. Honeywell Inc . 96. Pitney Bowes Inc. 
71. Hughes Tool Co. 97. Polaroid Corp. 
72. Illinois Tool Wks Inc. 98. Ralston Purina Co. 
(Continued) 
99. Raytheon Co. 
100. Reading & Bates Corp, 
101. Revlon Inc. 
102, Rexnord Inc. 
103, R J Reynolds Ind Inc, 
104. Rockwell Intl Corp. 
105. Rohm & Haas Co. 
106. Schering Plough Corp. 
107. Schlumberger Inc, 
108. Seagram Co. 
109. Singer Co. 
110, Smith Intl Inc, 
111. Srnithkline Corp. 
112, Sperry Corp. 
113, Squibb Corp, 
114. Standard Oil Co Calif, 
115. Standard Oil Co Ind. 
116. Sunds trand Corp. 
117. Superior Oil Co, 
118. Sybron Corp, 
119, TRW Inc. 
120. Texas Instrs Inc. 
121. Union Carbide Corp, 
122, Uniroyal Inc. 
123, United Brands Co, 
124, United Tech Corp , 
125. Upjohn Co. 
126. Varian Assoc Inc, 
127. Wa r ner Commn Inc. 
128, War ner Lambert Co. 
129, Wes tinghouse Elec Corp, 
130. Weyerhaeuser Co. 
131. Xerox Corp. 
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LIST OF ONGOING MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
1977-1981 
1. American Brands Inc. 
2. American Cyanamid Co. 
3. American Std Inc. 
4. Avon Prods Inc. 
5, Beatrice Foods Co, 
6. Black & Decker Mfg Co. 
7. Borg Warner Corp. 
8. Bristol Myer s Co, 
9, C PC Intl Inc. 
10. Chrysler Corp, 
11. Coca Cola Co, 
12, Control Data Corp. 
13. Deere & Co. 
14 . Digital Equip Corp. 
15. Dow Chem Co. 
16. Dresser Inds Inc. 
17, EI Du Pont & Co, 
18. Eastman Kodak Co, 
19. Firesto ne Tir e & Rub r Co, 
20, Fluor Corp, 
21, Ford Motor Co, 
22, Foster Wheeler Corp , 
23. General Elec Co, 
24. Gener al Foods Corp . 
25. General Motors Corp. 
26. Getty Oil Co, 
27, Goodyear Tire & Rub r Co. 
28, Gulf Oil Corp, 
29. Halliburton Co, 
30. Hercules Inc, 
31. Hewlett Packar d Co, 
32, Honeywell Inc, 
33, Ingersoll Rand Co, 
34, Intl Business Machs, 
35, Intl Harvester Co, 
36, Intl Tel & Teleg Corp, 
37, Johnso n & Johnson 
38, Li tton Inds Inc, 
39, Merck & Co Inc. 
40, Monsanto Co, 
41, Moto rola Inc, 
42 , N CR Corp, 
43, Occ i dental Pete Corp, 
44, Pfizer Inc, 
45, Ral s t on Pur i n a Co , 
46, Rev lon Inc, 
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47, R J Reynolds Inds Inc, 
48. Schering Plough Corp, 
49, Singe r Co, 
50, Srnithkline Corp, 
51, Sperry Corp, 
52, Standard Oil Co, 
53, TRW Inc, 
54, Texas Instrs Inc, 
55, Union Carbide Corp, 
56. United Bra nds Co, 
57. United Technologies Corp, 
58. Warner Lambert Co, 
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